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This essay provides an in-depth discussion of Patrick Baert and Filipe Carreira da 
Silva’s Social Theory in the Twentieth Century and Beyond. 
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Patrick Baert and Filipe Carreira da Silva’s Social Theory in the Twentieth Century 
and Beyond
2 
is undoubtedly one of the most comprehensive, intellectually 
stimulating, and up-to-date introductions to contemporary social theory.  The  
authors deserve to be congratulated for providing one of the few introductory 
handbooks that allow both academics and non-academics, both scholars and 
laypersons, both conceptually and empirically oriented social researchers, and both 
sociologists and other social scientists to appreciate the relevance of contemporary 
social theory to almost any kind of critical engagement with the social world. 
It is one of Baert and Silva’s great achievements to have illustrated, in an 
extraordinarily clear and intellectually challenging fashion, that social theory can  
and should be regarded as a sine qua non of critical social research. As the authors 
convincingly argue, social theory plays an increasingly pivotal role not only in 
sociology but also in other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, notably 
in philosophy, history, anthropology, psychology, economics, and political science. 
Hence, rather than conﬁning the relevance of social theory to the epistemic realm of 
sociology, Baert and Silva rightly insist upon its transdisciplinary spirit in three 
respects: ﬁrst, in terms of the origins of contemporary social theory (diﬀerent social 
theorists have diverging intellectual backgrounds and draw upon a large variety of 
sources); second, in terms of the themes examined in contemporary social theory 
(social theory touches upon multiple elements of the human world – in particular, 
sociological, philosophical, historical, anthropological, psychological, economic, and 
political dimensions – and it does so on three main levels, namely on the micro-level 
of the individual, the meso-level of community, and the macro-level of society); and, 
third, in terms of the inﬂuence of contemporary social theory (the debates that have 
shaped the development of social theory in recent decades have impacted not only 
upon empirical research undertaken in sociology  but also upon the ways in which 
 
 
 
  
social-scientiﬁc problems are studied and conceptualized in neighboring disciplines). 
In short, social theory should be conceived of as a transdisciplinary enterprise. Given 
its mission to overcome disciplinary boundaries and thereby challenge the counter- 
productive eﬀects of scientiﬁc tribalism, ‘it makes more sense to talk about social 
theory rather [sic] than sociological theory’ (p. 287). 
Before examining the weaker aspects of Baert and Silva’s excellent book, let     
us brieﬂy consider the key strengths of Social Theory in the Twentieth Century and 
Beyond. At least ﬁve positive qualities of this volume are especially worth 
mentioning. 
 
(1) Structure: The entire book is well organized, both in terms of its overall 
structure and in terms of the internal structure of each chapter. What is particularly 
useful for those with no, or very limited, knowledge of social theory is that each 
chapter has an underlying tripartite structure, which is aimed at covering the 
following aspects: (a) historical context, (b) crucial issues and contributions, and (c) 
strengths and weaknesses. Thus, the authors make it remarkably easy for the reader  
to make sense of contemporary social theory (a) by shedding light on the historical 
circumstances in which unique paradigmatic approaches have emerged and 
developed, (b) by explaining the essential issues at stake in speciﬁc intellectual 
traditions, as well as the principal contributions made by diﬀerent scholars, and (c) by 
drawing attention to the most signiﬁcant strengths and weaknesses of rival conceptual 
frameworks. This tripartite analytical structure, which is rigorously applied in each 
chapter, permits the reader to acquire an understanding of the most inﬂuential 
currents and controversies in contemporary social theory on the basis of three types 
of knowledge, which are fundamental to critical social science: (a) descriptive, (b) 
explanatory, and (c) evaluative knowledge. In their analysis, then, Baert and Silva 
accomplish three things. (a) They accurately describe the historical contexts and 
biographical itineraries which need to be taken into consideration in order to 
understand the emergence of idiosyncratic traditions in social theory. (b) They 
clearly and systematically explain the central themes, presuppositions, and 
contributions of diﬀerent modern social theories. (c) They oﬀer balanced accounts   
of these theories, not only by examining their respective strengths and weaknesses, 
but also by assessing their general relevance and usefulness. In addition, each chapter 
provides a section with recommended readings, covering both essential primary 
sources and informative texts that can be found in the secondary literature. 
 
(2) Scope: Anybody who has taught social theory at university level will have 
been confronted with the following two questions: ‘Where should we start, and 
where should we end?’ In this volume, which contains nine chapters, Baert and   
Silva are concerned primarily with contemporary, rather than classical, social  
theory. Hence, instead of beginning their journey by reminding us of the main 
contributions made by the founding ﬁgures of modern social thought, the authors 
focus largely on social theory in the twentieth and early twenty-ﬁrst centuries.  This  
is  not  to  suggest,  however,  that  they  consider  the  works  of  classical  
sociologists to be irrelevant to contemporary  forms  of  social  and  political  
analysis;  on the contrary, throughout  the  book,  they  remind  us  of  the  continuing  
relevance  of  classical sociological  thought  by  tracing  the  roots  of  
contemporary social theory in the writings of inﬂuential thinkers such as Karl  Marx, 
Max Weber,  Émile Durkheim,  Georg Simmel, and George Herbert Mead. Who, then, 
  
are the social theorists whose works are examined – that is, contextualized,  
explained, and assessed – in this book? The coverage is impressively wide-ranging, 
illustrating that Baert and Silva have an exceptionally profound and comprehen-    
sive knowledge of the history of modern social thought. 
Chapter 1 gives a useful overview of developments in twentieth-century French 
social theory, ranging from Émile  Durkheim’s  positivist  functionalism  and 
Ferdinand  de  Saussure’s  linguistic  structuralism  to  Pierre  Bourdieu’s  genetic  
structuralism and Luc Boltanski’s pragmatism. Chapter 2 explores the most 
signiﬁcant contributions made by inﬂuential functionalist and neo-functionalist 
thinkers, that is, by ‘early’ functionalists such as Herbert Spencer, Émile Durkheim, 
Bronisław Malinowski, and Alfred Reginald Radcliﬀe-Brown, as well as by ‘late’ 
functionalists such as Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton, Niklas Luhmann, and Jeﬀrey 
Alexander. Chapter 3 presents a lively and spirited account of the conceptual and 
methodological tools developed by micro-sociological theories. The relevance of the 
systematic study of everyday life, notably its pivotal role in the construction of social 
order, is demonstrated by reference to George Herbert Mead’s symbolic 
interactionism, Erving Goﬀman’s dramaturgical approach, Harold Garﬁnkel’s 
ethnomethodology, as well as Randall Collins’s and Russell Hardin’s  various  
studies of the role of rituals, emotions, and trust in the day-to-day functioning  of 
social life. Chapter 4 supplies an introduction to rational choice and game theories as 
well as to neo-institutionalist approaches, focusing on the writings of Jon Elster, 
Martin Hollis, David M. Kreps, Gary S. Becker, Paul DiMaggio, and Walter W. 
Powell. Chapter 5 is concerned with the sociology of modernity, in particular with 
Giddens’s structuration theory, but also with the works of historical sociologists  
such as Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Michael Mann, and Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt. 
Chapter 6 provides a remarkably clear and accessible account of Michel Foucault’s 
archaeological and genealogical studies, enabling the reader to grasp the impact of 
structuralist and post-structuralist thought on contemporary social theory. Chapter    
7 confronts the diﬃcult task of oﬀering a succinct summary of one of the most 
intellectually challenging approaches in modern social thought: critical theory. In 
this chapter, Baert and Silva concentrate on the writings of Jürgen Habermas, but  they 
also consider the recent contributions made by Claus Oﬀe and Axel Honneth. 
Chapter 8 stands out as one of the most exciting sections of this volume. This is due 
not only to the captivating language in which it is written, but also to the cutting- 
edge relevance of its thematic focus: late twentieth-century and early twenty-ﬁrst 
century social theories that seek to account for the alleged distinctiveness of the 
contemporary age, to which Baert and Silva provocatively refer as a ‘Brave New 
World’ (p. 248, italics added). With this, immensely diﬃcult, analytical task in mind, 
the authors examine the theoretical frameworks of ﬁve prominent contemporary 
scholars: Manuel Castells’s ‘network society’, Ulrich Beck’s ‘risk society’, Zygmunt 
Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’, Saskia Sassen’s ‘global society’, and Richard Sennett’s 
‘fall of the public man’. In the concluding chapter, Baert and Silva make a case for 
the continuing importance of social theory in the twenty-ﬁrst century. More 
speciﬁcally, they propose an outline of a ‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’ (p. 292, 
italics added), which forms the presuppositional basis of their own theoretical 
perspective. 
In brief, the study covers a wide range of currents and controversies that have 
shaped the development of social theory throughout the twentieth and early twenty- 
ﬁrst centuries. 
 
  
(3) Depth: The information provided in each chapter is not only authoritative 
and reliable but also highly useful and relevant to central debates in  the 
contemporary social sciences. In this volume, key controversies in modern social 
theory are contextualized, analyzed, and discussed in an eloquent and thought- 
provoking fashion. The authors’ willingness to engage not only with the secondary 
literature but also, closely and extensively, with primary sources makes this a 
particularly worthwhile book at a time in which ‘the social’ has been prematurely 
pronounced dead. One of the principal challenges when writing a comprehensive 
introduction to a conceptually dense and thematically diverse area of research, such 
as social theory, is to present complex ideas and sophisticated explanatory 
frameworks in an accessible language that encourages the readers to engage with   
the issues in question, rather than making them feel intimidated by the intricacy of 
the task that lies ahead of them. It is one of the major accomplishments of this 
volume to have achieved precisely this. Baert and Silva manage to simplify complex 
ideas without presenting them in a simplistic manner. More importantly, their 
analysis succeeds in separating essential arguments from less essential ones. To be 
sure, when giving an overview of the works of inﬂuential social theorists – such as 
Pierre Bourdieu, Luc Boltanski, Talcott Parsons,  Jeﬀrey  Alexander,  Michel  
Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, and Manuel Castells – it is impossible to do justice        to 
the entire complexity of their writings. Nonetheless, by virtue of their 
aforementioned tripartite analytical approach, Baert and Silva succeed  in ﬂeshing  
out the historical backgrounds, thematic foci, as well as the original contributions  
and noteworthy pitfalls of the countless works produced by twentieth-century social 
theorists.
3
 
 
(4) Language: Anyone who has taught social theory at diﬀerent academic levels 
and to diverse student bodies will have noticed one thing: social theory, along with 
social research methods, is one of the most unpopular ingredients of the sociology 
curriculum. The main reason for this is that social theory is often perceived as 
hopelessly abstract and unnecessarily complex, that is, as a conceptually 
sophisticated way of making relatively simple points in a remarkably diﬃcult 
language. As a result, many students – at  both  undergraduate  and  postgraduate 
levels – ﬁnd it diﬃcult to relate to, and easy to feel intimidated by, social theory. 
Over the past eight years, I have put the ﬁrst edition of this book on the top of the 
reading lists of the social theory modules I taught; in the future, I shall continue to  
do so with the second edition. The reason for this is rather straightforward: at 
institutions as diverse as Cambridge, Goldsmiths, Newcastle, Birkbeck, and City 
University London – the places at which I have taught and which have distinct 
research and teaching cultures with rather dissimilar, albeit internally heterogeneous, 
student bodies – the vast majority of my students would praise this volume as one of 
the most enjoyable and stimulating introductions to social theory. One may indeed 
suggest that the fact that this book tends to be amongst the most popular 
introductions  to contemporary social theory is indicative of the pragmatist spirit in 
which  it is written.
4       
For one of the main  objectives  of  the pragmatist project is to 
overcome the epistemological gap between scientists and laypersons. This is not to 
assert that Baert and Silva claim that the divide between scientiﬁc and ordinary 
forms of engaging with the world is entirely artiﬁcial and necessarily a bad thing; 
rather, this is to acknowledge that critical social scientists should seek to cross- 
fertilize these two spheres of cognition and interaction. 
 
  
(5) Contemporary relevance: A few words have to be said about the 
contemporary relevance of this volume. As the authors point out in the ‘Preface        
to the Second Edition’ (pp. viii–ix), ‘[t]he ﬁrst edition of this book appeared more 
than a decade ago’ (p. viii), and hence it seemed necessary to update the ﬁrst edition 
in order to account for the new paradigmatic trends that have shaped social theory at 
the dawn of the new millennium. Apart from taking note of the most obvious 
diﬀerence, which consists in the fact that the second edition is a co-authored, rather 
than a single-authored, volume, one has to congratulate Baert and Silva for having 
produced a truly updated version of this book based on three major amendments. 
First, literally all chapters have been substantially revised and coherently 
expanded. This is especially important with regard to the following chapters:  
Chapter 1, which now contains a useful section on Luc Boltanski’s pragmatic 
sociology; Chapter 3, which, in the new edition, includes a discussion of the works of 
Randall Collins and Russell Hardin; Chapter 4, which comprises a section on neo- 
institutionalism and its relation to rational choice theory; Chapter 5, which provides  
a detailed discussion of historical sociology, covering the works of renowned scholars 
such as Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Michael Mann, and Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt; 
and Chapter 7, in which, in addition to the oeuvre of Jürgen Habermas, the writings  of 
Claus Oﬀe and Axel Honneth are considered, thereby taking on board more recent 
developments in critical theory. 
Second, an entirely new chapter (Chapter 8) on current trends in social theory has 
been added to the book; this penultimate chapter may be regarded as a sign of the 
scholarly seriousness and intellectual rigor with which this volume has been updated. 
One could hardly think of a more ambitious and timely challenge than the task of 
accounting for the distinctiveness of the contemporary age. Baert and Silva’s analysis 
of Castells’s ‘network society’, Beck’s ‘risk society’, Bauman’s ‘liquid society’, 
Sassen’s ‘global society’, and Sennett’s ‘post-Fordist society’ is an impressively 
skillful and intellectually convincing attempt to attend to this task. 
Third, the concluding chapter (Chapter 9) has been completely rewritten. In this 
chapter, the authors succeed not only in arguing for the contemporary relevance of 
modern social theory, but also in developing a thought-provoking outline of an 
alternative theoretical program, which they characterize as a ‘hermeneutics-inspired 
pragmatism’ (p. 292). In short, the authors have made a sustained eﬀort to update  
this volume by expanding the scope of each chapter, covering cutting-edge forms of 
social theorizing, and making their own contribution to the ﬁeld. 
 
Let us, in the remainder of this review, examine some of the most signiﬁcant 
weaknesses of Social Theory in the Twentieth Century and Beyond. I shall limit myself 
to making (1) three critical remarks concerning the entire book, (2) three brief 
observations on the new chapter which deals with current trends in social theory,  and 
(3) a number of comments on the concluding chapter, in which the authors defend 
their own – hermeneutics-inspired  – version of pragmatism. 
 
 
1. Three critical comments on the book 
One of the ﬁrst things that may strike the reader about this volume is that it contains 
remarkably few reﬂections on the impact of classical sociology on contemporary 
social theory. Of course, one may legitimately argue that, as stated in the title, this 
study  is  concerned  primarily  with  social  theory  in  the twentieth  and twenty-ﬁrst 
 
  
centuries. Furthermore, one may point out that Chapter 1 comprises an entire 
section on Durkheim’s contributions and his inﬂuence upon French social theory 
and other intellectual traditions. Yet, the impact of the works of Marx, Weber, and 
Simmel on contemporary forms of social and political analysis is given relatively 
little consideration. This is particularly true with regard to the continuing 
signiﬁcance of Marxist thought: although its importance is cursorily mentioned in 
relation to existentialist,
5 
structuralist,
6 
and post-structuralist
7 
approaches, as well as 
with respect to critical theory
8 
and network theory,
9 
overall it is given only marginal 
treatment. If the authors decide to publish a third edition within the next decade, my 
suggestion would be to include an introductory chapter on the continuing relevance 
of Marxist, Weberian, Durkheimian, and Simmelian thought.
10
 
A second point that will have caught some readers’ attention is the fact that, as is 
clear both from the ‘Table of Contents’ and from the chapters themselves, the book 
contains hardly any information on non-mainstream approaches in contemporary 
social theory, some of which have become so inﬂuential that, by now, they may be 
regarded as fruitful elements of established, or indeed conventional, ways of social 
theorizing. Amongst these approaches are the following: feminist social theories (e.g. 
Lisa Adkins, Michèle Barrett, Judith Butler, Nancy  Fraser,  Sandra  Harding, Beverley 
Skeggs, Liz Stanley, Sylvia Walby); social theories of ethnicity and ‘race’ (e.g. Les 
Back, David Theo Goldberg, Caroline Knowles, Robert Miles, John Solomos); 
social theories of space (e.g. David Harvey, Henri Lefebvre, Doreen Massey, Georg 
Simmel, Edward Soja); post-modernist social theories (e.g. Jean Baudrillard, Mike 
Featherstone, Mike and Nicholas Gane,  Fredric  Jameson,  Douglas Kellner, Scott 
Lash, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Maﬀesoli, Steven Seidman,  John  Urry);  post-
structuralist and  deconstructivist  theories  (e.g. Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, 
Félix  Guattari, Slavoj Žižek); and actor-network  theories (e.g. Michel Callon, 
Bruno Latour, John Law, Donald MacKenzie). Whatever one makes of these 
approaches, all of them have had, and are likely to continue to have, a substantial 
impact on key debates in the social sciences. An introduction to contemporary 
social theory that claims to be comprehensive cannot possibly ignore their  
respective contributions.
11
 
The third issue, which ties in with the previous criticism, concerns a major 
limitation of this book, a limitation which – in defense of the authors – one may 
consider to be a central problem of both classical  and contemporary social  theory: 
the ‘white theory-boys syndrome’, that is, the ethnocentric, Anglocentric, andro- 
centric, and heteronormative nature of mainstream social theory. In other words, 
despite the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of feminist, post-colonial, and post-modern research 
agendas on the contemporary social sciences, social theory continues to be very  
much of a Eurocentric, predominantly Anglophone, white, middle-class, and male- 
dominated  language game. 
One needs only to look at the ‘Table of Contents’ of Social Theory in the 
Twentieth Century and Beyond
12  
to have this suspicion, once more, conﬁrmed. 
 
● Overall: The ‘Table of Contents’ makes (implicit or explicit) reference to at 
least 34 social theorists.
13
 
● Gender: 32 out of these 34 social theorists are male, and only two of them are 
female (the exceptions being Saskia Sassen and Theda Skocpol, although, 
occasionally, other female theorists – such as Margaret Archer, Seyla 
Benhabib, and Ève Chiapello – also enter the scene). 
 
  
● Nationality: 15 are North/US-American,14 5 are German,15 5 are French,16  3  
are British,
17 
1 is Francophone Swiss,
18 
1 is Spanish (but Anglophone),
19 
1 is 
Israeli (but Anglophone),
20 
1 is originally Polish (but Anglophone),
21 
1 is 
originally Dutch (but Anglophone)
22
, and 1 is Norwegian (but Anglophone).
23
 
● Language: All of them speak and write in Western European languages, that is, 
in the three languages that have dominated the development of the social 
sciences over the past two hundred years, namely English, French, and German. 
To be exact, 23 of them (that is, most of them) write and publish primarily in 
English,
24 
6 of them write and publish primarily in French,
25 
and 5 of them  
write and publish primarily in German.
26
 
● ‘Race’: All of them are white. 
● Class/education: All of them were educated at university level, and most of 
them have obtained their university degrees from prestigious institutions. 
● Sexual orientation: It may be inappropriate to make any assumptions about 
their sexual orientation, but, given the heteronormative nature of their writings, 
one may suspect that most of these theorists would regard themselves as 
heterosexual. 
● Age: None of the contemporary social theorists considered in this book is 
under forty years of age. 
● Ability: To my knowledge, none of the contemporary social theorists included 
in this study suﬀers from a major physical or mental disability. 
 
It would not make much sense to take these observations too far, but they do 
illustrate a main issue that needs to be addressed: social theory reproduces most of the 
negative ‘-isms’ (ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism, Anglocentrism, neo-colonialism, 
racism, sexism, elitism, classism, ageism, ableism, etc.) that its critical advocates 
denounce and seek to overcome. Let us just consider the problem of ethnocentrism in 
social theory: What about Asian, Australian, Latin-American, or African social 
theory? Do they actually exist? And, if so, why does hardly anybody seem to take 
them seriously in the Anglo- and Eurocentric world of contemporary academia?  
Does this prove the existence of Luhmann’s autopoiesis or Bourdieu’s self-referential 
ﬁelds? If there is ever going to be a third edition of this volume aiming to break out 
of the ethnocentric straitjacket of modern social theory, the authors will have a huge 
task on their hands: namely, to cover hitherto unexplored territories of a non- 
Eurocentric social theory, thereby avoiding the trap of reproducing at least some of 
the aforementioned ‘-isms’ in their  book.27 
 
2. Observations on Baert and Silva’s account of current trends in social theory 
First, the authors announce at the end of the introductory section of Chapter 8 that 
‘contemporary social theory is less a common enterprise than a discursive medium 
through which diﬀerent perspectives account for our world today’ (p. 249, italics 
added). This assertion is potentially confusing for two reasons: to begin with, it 
appears to downplay the importance of the signiﬁcant commonalities between 
recently formulated social theories, in particular with regard to their increased 
skepticism towards the promises of the Enlightenment project
28; more signiﬁcantly, 
however, this statement seems to ignore the fact that social theory, including its 
classical variants, has always been a discursive conglomerate of diverging – that is, 
competing and often contradictory – approaches. 
 
  
Second, on various occasions in this chapter (as well as in other chapters), Baert 
and Silva rightly criticize some of the social theorists whose work they examine for 
failing to present empirical evidence – or at least the right kind of empirical evidence – 
in support of their claims. They make it clear that, from their point of view, ‘[s]ocial 
theory needs to be supported by carefully designed empirical research’ (p. 268) and 
aﬃrm that some social theorists, such as Bauman, fail in this respect. This may be 
considered as a valid point, but it must also be said that Baert and Silver themselves 
hardly supply any empirical evidence to corroborate  their  arguments.
29  
Put 
diﬀerently, they commit the very fallacy they denounce in their analysis of the 
writings of other scholars: theoreticism. One may legitimately object that the purpose 
of a comprehensive introduction to social theory is not to provide the reader with 
empirically substantiated material, such as quantitative or qualitative  data.  Yet, 
given the centrality of this repeatedly made accusation, 319 pages should suﬃce to 
deliver at least a minimal amount of empirical evidence, in particular in relation to 
current trends in social theory (Chapter 8) and to the outline of their own theoretical 
model (Chapter 9). Otherwise, one gets the impression that the authors fail to practice 
what they preach. 
Third, directly related to the previous point, one wonders why the authors in the 
second part of the title of Chapter 8 refer to ‘The Empirical Turn in Social Theory’ 
(italics added).
30 
This title seems inappropriate for two reasons. First, no explanation 
is given as to why contemporary approaches in social theory should be associated 
with a paradigmatic shift worth describing as an ‘empirical turn’. In fact, if anything, 
the theorists discussed in this chapter endorse anti-empiricist positions, as expressed 
in Beck’s ‘reﬂexive turn’, Bauman’s ‘post-modern turn’, and Sennett’s ‘cultural 
turn’.31 Second, what is more perplexing is that several scholars in this chapter are 
criticized for their failure to provide appropriate empirical data in support of their 
arguments, notably Beck, Bauman, and Sennett. Hence, it is contradictory to entitle 
this chapter ‘The Empirical Turn in Social Theory’. 
 
 
3. Comments on the concluding chapter 
First, on various occasions the authors emphasize the central role that social theory 
plays not only in developing useful conceptual tools but also in setting constantly 
changing research agendas in the social sciences in general and in sociology in 
particular. Most social theorists will sympathize with this view, as it  gives  
legitimacy to the very process of social theorizing, underscoring the fact that, 
because of its capacity to supply both explanatory and evaluative frameworks for 
critical analysis, social theory is a cornerstone of social science. One may well agree 
with this perspective, but Baert and Silva’s assertions that ‘social theory is an 
increasingly important intellectual endeavour in the social sciences today’ (p. 285, 
italics added) and that, therefore, ‘the need for social theorizing has only increased’ 
(p. 274, italics added) are more questionable. Has this need really increased? And,    
if so, why? As far as I can see, the authors fail to explain why we should be     
inclined to believe that the task of social theorizing has gained in signiﬁcance.   
Social scientists have a tendency to defend the legitimacy of their endeavors by 
insisting upon the cutting-edge relevance of their research. The point is not to deny 
the centrality of social theory for the pursuit of a critical social science, but the 
authors need to explain why we should assume that social theory is more vital than 
ever before. 
 
  
Second, in a similar vein, it is surprising that the authors fail to back up  
seemingly central statements about the alleged uncertainty of the role and status of 
social theory in the contemporary world. The authors declare, for instance, that ‘the 
precise role of theory in empirical research has become increasingly uncertain’ (p. 285, 
italics added) and that ‘[t]here is growing uncertainty as to what social theory can or 
should achieve, especially in relationship to the various social sciences it is supposed 
to serve’ (p. 288, italics added). They go on to maintain that ‘[i]ronically, there was 
more of a consensus on these matters during the period preceding the prominence of 
social theory’ (p. 288, italics added). These assertions regarding the alleged 
uncertainty of the role and status of social theory in the twenty-ﬁrst century are 
problematic for a number of reasons. First, the authors may be entirely right in 
making these judgments, but they need to substantiate them. Second, there seems to 
be a tension between the aforementioned assumption that social theory is an 
increasingly important intellectual endeavor and the view that there is growing 
uncertainty about its mission and objectives. How can we claim that social theory is 
ever more important and at the same time aﬃrm that it is increasingly unclear what it 
is supposed to achieve? We cannot possibly contend that social theory plays an 
increasingly pivotal role in the social sciences if we are unclear about its general 
purpose and overall function. Third, it is highly questionable whether or not the 
authors are right to suggest that there was ‘more of a consensus on these matters’ (p. 
288, italics added) before social theory came into full swing. We need only to look at 
the ‘methodological dispute’ (Methodenstreit), the enduring importance of which 
manifests itself in epistemological divisions such as positivism versus interpretivism, 
materialism versus idealism, objectivism versus subjectivism, and realism versus 
constructivism. These paradigmatic antinomies make evident that, if there has ever 
been a universal agreement about the role of social theory, it is the consensus that 
there is no such consensus. Baert and Silva are right to point out that the social 
sciences in general and social theory in particular are both intellectually and 
institutionally diversiﬁed, but this does not mean that, for this reason, there is now 
less of a common understanding about its purpose and mission than there was in the 
early  modern period. 
Third, the authors go so far as to state that ‘social theory is the main vehicle 
through which intellectual debates occur’ (p. 286, italics added) and that ‘it sets the 
agenda for what is to be studied, and how it should be studied’ (p. 286, italics added). 
In support of this claim, they argue that ‘[t]his can be easily demonstrated by the way 
in which intellectual developments within social theory have preceded and framed 
debates in the social sciences’ (p. 286, italics added). There is no point in 
downplaying the agenda-setting power of social theory, but the examples given by 
the authors to validate this are far from convincing.
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For instance, what is 
questionable in this context is their reference to Habermas’s theory of the public 
sphere, which in Germany, at least in the period following its publication, was 
discussed as a major contribution to political sociology and historical sociology, 
rather than to social theory. In brief, we must not overestimate the agenda-setting 
inﬂuence of social theory. 
Fourth, Baert and Silva draw an interesting distinction between social theory and 
sociological theory (p. 287). They favor the former over the latter, because, as they 
explain, the term ‘social theory’ implies  a transdisciplinary mode of engagement with  
the social sciences in general, whereas the term ‘[s]ociological theory suggests a 
discipline-bound  form  of  theorizing  [. . .],  theory  for  sociological  research’   (p. 287, 
 
  
italics added). This is an important point, as it illustrates that Baert and Silva are 
ﬁrmly committed to conceiving of social theory as a transdisciplinary undertaking. 
They could have gone one step further, however, by pointing out  that  the  term 
‘social theory’ is based on a broad understanding of social theorizing in three respects: 
 
(a) Social theory is a transdisciplinary endeavor  whose  epistemic  journeys  can 
lead to fruitful forms of knowledge production only insofar as it is capable of 
transcending self-referential comfort zones of social research (‘social theory’, 
rather  than  ‘sociological  theory’). 
(b) Social theory is a reﬂexive project whose relative success depends on its 
ability to recognize the socio-historical contingency of all cognitive claims to 
epistemic validity, including the assertions made by social theorists 
themselves (‘social theory’, rather than ‘theory of society’). 
(c) Social theory is a holistic project whose aim is to provide explanatory 
accounts of the relational functioning of the social world on the micro-, 
meso-, and macro-levels (‘social theory’, rather than ‘theory of the 
individual’, ‘theory of community’, or ‘theory of society’). 
 
A key aspect which appears to be missing from Baert and Silva’s account is a self- 
critical reﬂection on the fact that they remain largely focused on social theory as an 
Anglophone construct. One does not even need to look beyond Europe to become 
aware of this limitation. In France, the concept the´orie sociale is not generally on the 
agenda of established teaching or research institutions in the social sciences, nor is 
there  anything  like  a  Revue  de  the´orie  sociale.  The  same  appears  to  apply  to 
Mediterranean countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece. In Germany, 
concepts such as Sozialtheorie and soziale Theorie are used rarely; the term 
Gesellschaftstheorie is employed more frequently, but it puts the emphasis on the 
macro-sociological aspects of social theory (particularly common amongst Marxists, 
functionalists, and systems theorists), thereby excluding micro-sociological concerns, 
which fall into the area of Gemeinschaftstheorie (a term that is hardly ever used). In 
light of Baert and Silva’s fascination with pragmatist (and, hence, largely 
Anglophone) approaches  in the social sciences, their  lack of critical reﬂection on  
the Anglocentric nature of social theory, including their own perspective, does not 
come as a surprise. 
Fifth, at the heart of Baert and Silva’s own program, which they describe as a 
‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’ (p. 292), lies their critique of two alternative 
models, which they consider to be obsolete: the ‘deductive-nomological model’ and 
the ‘representational model’ (pp. 288–92). The former ‘conceives of theory [. . .] as a 
set of laws and initial conditions from which empirical hypotheses can be derived’ (p. 
288); by contrast, the latter regards theory ‘as providing the conceptual building 
blocks for capturing or picturing the empirical world’ (p. 288). Their characteriza- 
tion of these two models, however, is problematic on several counts. First, they claim 
that these two views ‘are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and some authors 
subscribed to both’ (p. 288). Yet, they do not tell us why and to what extent these two 
perspectives may be regarded as mutually complementary, not to mention the fact 
that the reader is left in the dark as to who exactly subscribes to both accounts. 
Second, they aﬃrm that ‘[u]ntil recently the deductive-nomological model and its 
realist alternative were dominant ways of thinking about the relationship between 
theory and empirical research, but both have now been shown to be problematic’ (p. 
 
  
285, italics added). The suggestion that these two epistemological models have only 
recently lost credibility disregards the fact that both approaches have been under 
attack since the early days of the Methodenstreit. Third, they assert that, ‘[i]n the 
latter part of the twentieth century, the deductive-nomological view came under 
intense scrutiny, and gave way gradually to the representational model’ (p. 290), 
when actually the opposite is true: most of the various paradigmatic ‘turns’ 
proclaimed in the social sciences over the past three decades are associated with 
ﬁerce opposition to the representational model, because of its alliance with diﬀerent – 
increasingly unpopular – forms of epistemological objectivism, realism, and 
correspondence theories of truth. This move away from the representational model   
is reﬂected in paradigmatic shifts such as the ‘interpretive turn’, the ‘perspectivist 
turn’, the ‘discursive turn’, the ‘cultural turn’, the ‘contingent turn’, the ‘performative 
turn’, the ‘pragmatic  turn’, and  the ‘post-modern turn’. 
Finally,  we  need to reﬂect upon  the nature  of Baert  and Silva’s own perspective,  
to which they refer as a ‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’ (p. 292, italics added). Let 
us  consider  only  a  few,  particularly  problematic, issues. 
 
(a) My ﬁrst comment regarding the authors’ proposal for a ‘hermeneutics- 
inspired pragmatism’ concerns a terminological problem. Baert and Silva 
repeatedly emphasize that one of their principal aims is to combine 
hermeneutics and pragmatism (see especially pp. 292–3). On one occasion, 
however, they aﬃrm that, ‘[b]y integrating American neo-pragmatism and 
phenomenology, [they] will demonstrate not only the bearing of pragmatism 
on contemporary philosophy of social science, but also the fruitfulness of a 
continued dialogue between the two traditions which on the surface look so 
diﬀerent’ (p. 293, italics added). The point is not to deny that useful insights 
may be gained from cross-fertilizing pragmatist and phenomenological or 
hermeneutical thought; the point is to be aware of the fact that  
phenomenology and hermeneutics, although they are obviously historically 
and intellectually related, constitute two diﬀerent philosophical traditions. 
The former is concerned primarily with the study of consciousness and 
experience, whereas the latter is interested mainly in the nature of meaning and 
interpretation. In other words, Baert and Silva should be careful not to use the 
terms ‘phenomenology’ and ‘hermeneutics’ interchangeably, even less so if they 
lie at the heart of their own theoretical model. A ‘hermeneutics-inspired 
pragmatism’ and a ‘phenomenology-inspired pragmatism’ are not the same 
thing. Furthermore, when insisting upon ‘the fruitfulness of an  ongoing 
dialogue between American neo-pragmatism and continental philosophy, which, 
for far too long, have been regarded as addressing irreconcilable intellectual 
concerns’ (p. 304, italics added), the authors fail to specify who has considered 
them as incompatible traditions and, more importantly, why this has been the 
case. The passive voice is symptomatic of the vagueness of this claim. 
(b) It is striking that the authors’ plea for a ‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’ 
is weakened by a considerable degree of epistemic relativism. This relativist 
tendency is reﬂected in various statements, such as the following: 
[. . .] we will argue that the key to social research is not that it captures a 
previously hidden reality, but that it presents new innovative readings of the 
social. What is novel or innovative is relative to the common views which are 
currently held in the academic community and beyond. (p. 291, italics added) 
 
  
[. . .] what precisely do we gain from learning that a particular social setting can 
be rephrased in terms of a given theory [. . .]? The answer is remarkably little. (p. 
291, italics added) 
As illustrated in these assertions, the authors appear to take a relativist 
stance, inspired by a mixture of Rortian pragmatism, Kuhnian contextualism, 
and Gadamerian hermeneutics. Due to their somewhat one-sided emphasis on 
the respective merits of pragmatist, contextualist, and hermeneutical 
approaches to knowledge, the authors overlook the fact that, in both the natural 
sciences and the social sciences, invaluable insights can be gained from the 
search for universally valid forms of knowledge. Of course, similar not only to 
pragmatist thinkers, such as Rorty, but also to post-modernist   and post-
structuralist thinkers, such as Foucault and  Derrida,  Baert  and Silva are 
deeply suspicious of the view that both the natural sciences and the social 
sciences have an ‘uncovering mission’, which enables them to shed light on 
underlying causal mechanisms that are not immediately visible to  ordinary 
actors. One may legitimately object, however, that there is not much left of 
science if we disregard one of its most empowering features: its capacity to 
disclose underlying causal relations that escape the doxic horizon of both 
immediate experience and common sense.
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(c) Another considerable weakness of Baert and Silva’s proposal for a ‘hermeneu- 
tics-inspired pragmatism’ is its failure to make a genuinely new contribution. 
They make a case for various views that have been defended for almost two 
hundred years by other philosophers of social science. Even if one is inclined to 
sympathize with their proposal for a ‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’, one 
may have doubts about the originality of some of the most fundamental 
assumptions upon which it is based. Let us consider three examples: 
First, the authors complain that, ‘[f]or too long, the dualism between theory 
and practice and its attendant preoccupation with accurate representation has 
led Western philosophers to ignore the practical diﬀerence knowledge can 
make’ (pp. 296–7, italics added). Moreover, they stress that ‘[p]ragmatism 
breaks with this dualism and takes seriously the notion of scientiﬁc engagement’ 
(p. 297, italics added). Yet, the ambition to overcome the antinomy between 
theory and practice is as old as social science itself. We need only to remind 
ourselves of Marx’s famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach or of the various 
Enlightenment-inspired attempts by social scientists to ‘make a diﬀerence’ by 
having a direct and positive impact upon the organization of the social world. 
Second, the authors rightly attack the ‘mirror view’ of knowledge, which, as they 
point out, ‘conceives of knowledge in terms of passive and accurate 
recording of the essence of the external world. In this view, the external world is 
taken to be independent of human experience, waiting to be discovered’ (p. 296, 
italics added). This is a pretty accurate description of what we may call the 
‘correspondence theory of truth’, based on the positivist belief in the 
representational capacity of objective knowledge and the Enlightenment trust 
in the civilizing power of modern science. It is erroneous, however, to suggest 
that ‘[t]he mirror view is widespread both in philosophical and [in] scientiﬁc 
circles’ (p. 296, italics added). One may agree with Baert and Silva’s claim that 
the ‘mirror view’ of knowledge tends to reproduce the theory/practice dualism, 
as it fails to account for the practical–and, hence, socio-historically situated– 
constitution of all forms of epistemic production.
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Nonetheless, it seems that, 
 
 
 
 
 in this case, Baert and Silva are ﬂogging a dead horse, since there are hardly any 
contemporary thinkers, let alone current sociologists, who would seriously 
defend the ‘mirror view’ of knowledge and share its ﬂawed presuppositions. 
Third, the authors insist upon the hermeneutical nature of all knowledge, 
reminding us that ‘social researchers should realize that [. . .] their cultural 
presuppositions are a sine qua non condition for the research they conduct’ (p. 
297) and that ‘[a]ny knowledge of the social world relies on a set of 
presuppositions’ (p. 299). Once again, however, this is a position which has 
been defended by hermeneutically inspired philosophers and social scientists for 
at least two centuries, that is, certainly since the Methodenstreit. Indeed, it would 
be diﬃcult to identify any contemporary scholars who would seriously disagree 
with this perspective. Even the more ambitious idea that ‘self-referential 
knowledge brings these presuppositions to the foreground’ (p. 299) and that 
‘self-referential knowledge acquisition entails a critical stance’ (p. 298) is a view 
to which most contemporary – particularly critical – social scientists would 
comfortably subscribe. Hence, it is far from clear where the contribution of this 
proposition, which is as old as social science itself, actually lies. 
(d) A further problematic dimension of Baert and Silva’s ‘hermeneutics-inspired 
pragmatism’ is its conception of culture. In this context, it may be useful to 
distinguish two levels of culture: culture as a socio-ontological condition of 
everyday existence, and culture as a presuppositional condition of knowledge. 
With regard to the former, the authors make the interesting claim that ‘[r]ich, 
vital cultures are conﬁdent enough to exhibit openness towards uncomfor- 
table experiences’ (p. 296). In connection with the latter, they assert that 
‘social researchers ought to be expected to be aware of the categories and 
assumptions that accompany their research and to make that knowledge 
publicly available’ (p. 297). There are good reasons to share the authors’ 
supposition that the conscious experience of culture can have an enlightening 
or emancipatory value, especially in situations in which actors, in the face of 
exposure to unfamiliar social settings, are obliged to question the norms and 
conventions they habitually take for granted. As Baert and Silva eloquently 
put it, ‘[b]y being exposed to diﬀerent forms of life, individuals are 
confronted with the ethnocentricity and locality of their views, expectations 
and perceptions’ (p. 298); and, ‘[t]hrough confrontation with diﬀerence, 
people are encouraged to reﬂect on and put discursively their previously 
unquestioned assumptions’ (p. 298). Yet, this notion of culture is problematic 
for the following reasons. 
First, the authors fail to deﬁne what exactly they mean by the term 
‘culture’. Given that the concept of culture plays a pivotal role in Baert and 
Silva’s pragmatist account of the social, they need to spell out which 
particular understanding of this term underlies their theoretical framework. 
The concept of culture can be given radically diﬀerent meanings: for instance, 
in sociology (culture as a social construction), anthropology (culture as a 
collective life form), pedagogy (culture as education or Bildung), philosophy 
(culture as an existential source of species-constitutive transcendence), and 
the arts (culture as an aesthetic  experience). 
Second, the assumption that dynamic cultures are open to change, even if 
this involves unsettling experiences, appears overly optimistic, since most 
cultures – notably majority cultures – constitute power-laden modes of social 
 
  
functioning. Although cultures are by deﬁnition in a constant state of ﬂux, 
because the most rigid form of codiﬁed interactions cannot eliminate the 
unfolding capacity of human agency, they are sustained by processes of 
inclusion and exclusion as well as through the hierarchization of legitimate 
and illegitimate forms of symbolic capital. 
Third, the authors’ enthusiasm for cultural diversity, which stands in line 
with recent trends in the social sciences, underestimates the complexities 
involved in the construction of multicultural realities. 
 
(i) On the micro-level, the formation of multicultural identities is far more 
complex than the authors seem to acknowledge. An actor’s capacity to 
‘commute back and forth’ between diﬀerent cultural identities can be 
both empowering and disempowering, enlightening and confusing, 
enriching and destabilizing. Just as the formation of multicultural 
identities can encourage the cosmopolitan exercise of perspective-taking, 
it can trigger personality disorders suﬀered by culturally confused  
human actors, who are constantly haunted by questions such as ‘Who  
am I?’, ‘Where do I belong?’, and ‘Which is my (favorite) cultural 
home?’. 
(ii) On the meso-level, the formation of multicultural communities is also 
much more fraught with diﬃculties than the authors appear to accept. 
Anybody who has been immersed in (ephemeral or stable) multicultural 
communities will have asked themselves practical questions such  as 
‘How should I interact with these people?’, ‘How am I expected to eat 
my food?’, ‘How can or should I express my sexuality?’, and ‘What 
language are we supposed to speak?’. 
(iii) On the macro-level, the formation of multicultural societies is by no 
means less complicated. Anybody who has lived in multicultural 
societies – such as Britain, France, or Germany – will be aware of the 
immense diﬃculties involved in organizing ethnically diversiﬁed settings 
on a large scale. ‘What are the agreed moral standards upon which 
everybody can agree?’, ‘How do we reconcile diﬀerent norms and 
conventions with each other in a society with a majority culture and 
various minority cultures?’, ‘Why is there, by and large, little 
communication between culturally deﬁned micro-worlds, which may 
exist peacefully side by side, but which in practice do not mix with one 
another?’. 
 
As usual, there are more questions than answers, but unfortunately Baert and 
Silva do not even seem to raise these questions when putting forward their – 
naïvely optimistic – view that the experience of cultural diﬀerence, if 
accompanied by critical reﬂection, is essentially empowering. Multicultural 
citizens and multicultural social scientists will be only too aware of the fact that 
the construction of normatively codiﬁed realities is vastly more complicated and 
power-laden than Baert and Silva appear to concede.
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(e) Let us consider the cornerstone of Baert and Silva’s ‘hermeneutics-inspired 
pragmatism’: the concept of self-referential knowledge acquisition or, as they 
also call it, self-knowledge (see especially p. 298). As they explain, this 
particular mode of knowledge entails four key epistemological components: 
 
  
conceptualization, critique, ediﬁcation, and imagination (see especially pp. 
298–9). I shall conﬁne myself to making three critical comments in this 
regard. 
First, a semantic point: the authors make a case for an alternative, 
‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’, based on what they conceive of as ‘self- 
referential knowledge acquisition’. In this context, ‘self-referential’ is a 
slightly misleading term, as it evokes largely negative connotations captured 
in synonyms such as ‘self-suﬃcient’, ‘self-indulgent’, ‘monological’, ‘dog- 
matic’, ‘closed-minded’, ‘provincial’, ‘parochial’, ‘insular’, or – using a 
systems-theoretic concept – ‘autopoietic’. Ironically, the authors seek to 
make a case for an idea which is diametrically opposed to these negative 
meanings of the term ‘self-referential’; what they have in mind is a ‘self- 
critical’, ‘self-reﬂexive’, ‘open’, ‘dialogical’, and ‘undogmatic’ attitude. In 
brief, Baert and Silva’s ‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’ is founded upon 
the notion of self-critical, rather than self-referential, knowledge acquisition.  
Second, Baert and Silva’s plea for a ‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’ is 
weakened by the fact that there is considerable overlap between the four main 
epistemological components of their program. This is particularly the case 
with regard to the ﬁrst two elements: ‘conceptualization’ and ‘critique’. As 
they state, the former ‘implies a process of [. . .] discursive formulation’ (p. 
298) which ‘enables individuals to make explicit a number of presuppositions 
which they took for granted hitherto’ (p. 298, italics added); the latter ‘entails 
a critical stance’ (p. 298) which ‘encourages individuals to examine and 
question their hitherto unquestioned presuppositions’ (p. 298, italics added). As 
is obvious from these quotations, the two epistemological tasks are almost 
identical. Something similar applies to the remaining two aspects: ‘ediﬁcation’ 
and ‘imagination’. In this context, the former is used to indicate ‘the process 
of self-formation [Bildung] that accompanies genuine knowledge acquisition’ 
(p. 298) and that allows people, through their exposure to cultural diﬀerence, 
to question ‘the ethnocentricity and locality of their views, expectations and 
perceptions’ (p. 298, italics added), which they thereby cease to regard ‘as 
natural, ﬁxed or universal’ (p. 298); the latter ‘implies the broadening of our 
imaginative scope’ (p. 298), a process whereby ‘people become aware of the 
existence of alternative socio-political scenarios’ (p. 299), enabling them ‘to 
think beyond the frameworks and practices that are currently in operation’ (p. 
299, italics added). Again, the similarity between these two epistemological 
tasks is striking. One may share the view that these undertakings are essential 
to the pursuit of social-scientiﬁc research, but the somewhat repetitive nature 
of Baert and Silva’s argument weakens, rather than strengthens, their plea for 
a ‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’. 
Third, one may have legitimate doubts about the originality and viability 
of Baert and Silva’s program. They state that ‘the ultimate aim of the research 
which we are propagating is to become aware of, conceptualize, and possibly 
unsettle the presuppositions that make possible knowledge in the ﬁrst place’ (p. 
299, italics added). Apart from the fact that this overall objective has been on 
the agenda ever since hermeneutics and critical social sciences have come into 
existence, it seems rather ‘thin’ – that is, insuﬃciently ambitious – to declare 
that the ultimate aim of one’s research program is the unsettling of taken-for- 
granted assumptions. In a way, this illustrates one of the key weaknesses of 
 
  
pragmatist programs in the humanities and social sciences generally: their 
lack of normative aspiration, which essentially derives from their – entirely 
legitimate – distrust vis-à-vis grand narratives. The insuﬃciently ambitious 
spirit underlying the pragmatist attitude is reﬂected in formulations such as 
the following: ‘[t]he ultimate aim of this type of research is to encourage a 
Gestalt switch so that people think very diﬀerently about things’ (p. 301). Not 
only do these statements demonstrate a lack of commitment to ﬁrst-order 
normative standards that may transcend cultural speciﬁcity, but they are also 
remarkably vague when urging actors to ‘think very diﬀerently about things’ 
(p. 301). Almost anybody could subscribe to the above statement: anarchists, 
communists, socialists, social democrats, liberals, conservatives, and prob- 
ably even fascists. The ideological elasticity of pragmatist programs is a sign 
of their lack of substantive content, rather than of their ability to make a case 
for context-transcending normative standards based on a strong notion of 
value rationality. Seduced by the comfortable advantages of the pragmatist 
position, reﬂected in the pluralist vocabulary of ‘openness’, ‘dialogue’, 
‘mutual understanding’, and ‘imagination’, Baert and Silva’s normative 
stance is limited to the playful attitude of the liberal ironist a` la Rorty. 
(f) This brings us to one ﬁnal point of criticism, which ties in with the previous 
one. Unsurprisingly, the authors follow other pragmatist philosophers in 
rejecting what they consider to be pointless forms of scholastic – that is, 
practically insigniﬁcant – forms of theorizing. This pragmatist conviction is 
expressed in the following statement: 
Pragmatism is sceptical of intellectual disputes if taking one or another position 
has no practical consequences for anyone [. . .]. For pragmatists, questions about 
inner essences or ontology are such scholastic enterprises because answering 
them in one way or another makes no practical diﬀerence. (p. 294, italics added) 
 
This passage sums up ﬁve fundamental presuppositions of philosophical 
pragmatism: (i) anti-intellectualism, (ii) anti-theoreticism, (iii) anti-transcendental- 
ism, (iv) anti-essentialism, and (v) anti-foundationalism. 
 
(i) According to the anti-intellectualist position, we need to be suspicious of 
intellectuals’ capacity to invent ‘private languages’ for themselves to 
which non-intellectuals do not have access and from which they are 
largely excluded. In practice, intellectualism leads to self-referential 
snobbism and cultural elitism, reﬂected in the paternalist hierarchy 
between ‘the enlighteners’ and ‘the to-be-enlightened’. 
(ii) According to the anti-theoreticist position, we need to be critical of 
scholars and academics who specialize in developing ‘theories of 
practice’ merely on the basis of the ‘practice of theorizing’, that is, 
without substantiating their arguments by virtue of empirical evidence. 
Just as empirical social research without a serious engagement with 
theoretical concerns runs the risk of being conceptually naïve, mere 
analytical speculation without a genuine commitment to substantive 
investigation tends to produce sterile and self-referential explanatory 
frameworks removed from embodied social practices. 
(iii) According to the anti-transcendentalist position, we need to be wary of 
cognitive, moral, and aesthetic frameworks that claim  universal validity 
 
  
and thereby neglect the relativity of their own socio-historical 
determinacy. Relevant to the course of individual and social develop- 
ment are not so much abstract principles and categorical imperatives,   
but the spatio-temporal contingency and practical consequences of our 
reﬂections and actions. 
(iv) According to the anti-essentialist position, we need to be distrustful of 
ambitious scientiﬁc attempts to uncover underlying essences and 
ontologies. What is crucial is to understand how social realities,  far  
from being simply determined by ahistorical properties or context- 
transcending ontologies, are shaped by the contingent relations between 
spatio-temporally  situated actors. 
(v) According to the anti-foundationalist position, we need to be skeptical 
about the philosophical search for epistemic and normative foundations. 
Time and again the experience of modernity has shown that the obsession 
with foundations tends to result in the monological imposition, rather 
than the dialogical negotiation, of cognitive and normative standards. 
 
While all of the above objections reﬂect legitimate concerns based on powerful 
arguments against the common pitfalls of modern social thought, the pragmatist 
stance is by no means less  problematic. 
 
(i) Anti-intellectualism: The pragmatist aim to overcome counterproductive 
divisions between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, scientists and 
laypersons, legitimate voices and voiceless voices is, surely, something 
to be applauded. In practice, however, it seems that most pragmatist 
social theorists reproduce the very mechanisms to which they are 
opposed: the communities to which they belong and through which they 
engage in rational debates are largely made up of other intellectuals. Only 
a tiny proportion of non-academics on this planet will have ever heard of 
philosophical pragmatism. Most pragmatist social theorists are situated 
in the same intellectual and institutional ivory towers as their anti- 
pragmatist counterparts.
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In addition, Baert and Silva seem  to  forget 
that we must account not only for the negative and patronizing elements 
but also for the positive and empowering aspects involved in the epistemic 
division of labor between expert knowledge, generated by intellectuals, 
and common-sense knowledge, relied upon by ordinary actors. 
(ii) Anti-theoreticism: The pragmatist conviction that the gulf between 
theoreticist and empiricist modes of engaging with the  social  world 
needs to be overcome is another objective that is to be welcomed. It must 
be acknowledged, however, that both classical pragmatists (e.g. Dewey, 
James, Mead, and Peirce) and contemporary pragmatists (e.g. Bernstein, 
Davidson, Goodman, Putnam, and Rorty, but also Baert and Silva 
themselves) rarely back up their views with empirical data. Moreover, 
there are not many empirical social researchers, not even in the 
Anglophone world of social science, who claim to be inspired by 
pragmatist  thought. 
(iii) Anti-transcendentalism: The pragmatist attack on the modern – for 
example, Kantian – obsession with the rational defense of context- 
transcending standards has received, and will continue to receive, a lot 
 
  
of sympathy in an intellectual climate shaped by the late-modern – or, as 
some may argue, post-modern – vocabulary of ‘multiculturalism’ and 
‘the politics of diﬀerence’. If there is one signiﬁcant positive contribution 
made by both pragmatist and post-modernist thought it is the suggestion 
that, while cosmopolitanism may end up embracing a sterile, hegemonic, 
and power-reproducing intellectual posture, multiculturalism can work 
only as a constant, and in many ways contradictory, perspective-taking 
exercise. Yet, if we turn our back on the possibility of distinguishing 
between ﬁrst-order principles, to which everybody should adhere 
regardless of their cultural background, and second-order principles, 
which are by deﬁnition socio-culturally contingent, we ﬁnd ourselves 
immersed in an ocean of cognitive and moral relativism, in which we 
function in accordance with opportunistic considerations of parochial 
localism and situationist short-termism and in which we make both 
individual and collective decisions in merely context-speciﬁc terms. 
(iv) Anti-essentialism: The pragmatist rejection of the scientistic ambition to 
uncover underlying essences and ontologies sounds compelling in that it 
permits us to account for the fact that the constitution of the social   
world depends on the relations established between actors, rather than  
on ahistorical substances or context-transcending ontologies. Put 
diﬀerently, as critical social scientists we should be interested in the 
construction of human realities in terms of ‘relations between actors’, 
rather than in terms of ‘entities in themselves’, if we aim to make sense of 
the relatively arbitrary and inevitably power-laden contingency of all 
forms of sociality. The problem with this anti-essentialist – that is, 
relationalist – position, however, is that it does not take us very far, if we 
categorically deny the impact of both bio-ontological and socio- 
ontological forces upon the development of human existence. Regardless 
of whether we seek to maintain or abolish the distinction between the 
natural world and the social world, biological and sociological 
determinants, and ‘given’ and ‘fabricated’ realities,  a  pragmatist 
program  can succeed  only to the extent  that it is prepared to accept   
that reality is a conglomerate of interrelated beings. 
(v) Anti-foundationalism: The pragmatist assault on all forms of cognitive 
and normative foundations is not only one of the most powerful but also 
one of the most problematic aspects of a philosophical position that 
refuses to subscribe to a speciﬁc set of shared rational or moral 
presuppositions. The vagueness of this relativist stance is reﬂected in 
Baert and Silva’s deﬁnition of humanism: ‘By humanism, we refer to a 
particular perspective according to which cognitive, ethical and aesthetic 
claims, including claims about those claims, are intertwined with human 
projects and are predominantly human creations’ (p.  295).  This 
deﬁnition of humanism is useful in that it illustrates one of the most 
problematic aspects of pragmatist thought: its unwillingness to defend a 
set  of  universalizable   values   and   context-transcending   standards, 
let alone a philosophical program explicitly based on normative 
foundations. As it stands, almost anybody, with any kind of ideological 
conviction, could support the above deﬁnition of humanism: not only 
anarchists,   communists,    socialists,   social    democrats,   liberals,   or 
 
  
conservatives, but even fascists would claim that their ideology is 
concerned with ‘human creations’ and ‘human projects’. To be sure, 
pragmatists are caught up in what Habermas would describe as a 
‘performative contradiction’, since, at least implicitly, they do subscribe 
to a set of – however vaguely deﬁned – values, such as ‘openness’, 
‘dialogue’, ‘mutual understanding’, and ‘imagination’. More debatable, 
however, are the pragmatists’ reluctance to endorse a clear set of 
categorical principles and their hesitation before the possibility of 
grounding them in a coherent cognitive or normative framework. 
Empowering human projects cannot dispense with justiﬁable principles 
mobilized in consideration of the socio-ontological conditions under- 
lying emancipatory life forms. The key elements of an emancipatory 
society are not to be ‘discovered’ in the foundations of intellectual 
thought, but to be constructed, and constantly reinvented, by exploring 
the empowering conditions of human existence, that is, by realizing both 
the species-constitutive and the species-empowering potentials that have 
allowed us to raise ourselves out of the natural world by creating, and 
immersing ourselves within, the social world. 
 
Notes 
1. An abridged version of this paper was presented on 10 September 2011 in Session 8 of the 
Meet-the-Author Events at the 10th Conference of the European Sociological 
Association (Geneva, Switzerland, 7–10 September 2011). I would like to thank Patrick 
Baert for his thoughtful, perceptive, and constructive response to the issues raised during 
our discussion. In addition, I am grateful to Sandro Cattacin (Université de Genève) for 
organizing this session. Last but not least, I am indebted to Richard Armstrong for his 
pertinent comments on a draft version of this article. 
2. Patrick Baert and Filipe Carreira da Silva, Social Theory in the Twentieth Century and 
Beyond (2nd Edition, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010 [1998]) [ISBN: 9780745639802, ISBN 
9780 745639819 (paperback); 319 pp.]. In this paper, all page references (both in the body 
of the text and in the notes) are to this edition. 
3. Some skeptics may criticize Baert and Silva for failing to make a major contribution to 
the literature, but it seems to me that an objection of this kind misses the point for three 
main reasons: ﬁrst, because we are dealing with a book that provides an introduction to 
twentieth-century social theory; second, because each chapter contains original evaluative 
reﬂections on the respective approaches under scrutiny; and, third, because in the ﬁnal 
chapter (Chapter 9) the authors make a signiﬁcant contribution to the literature by 
proposing an outline of a ‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’. 
4. The entire manuscript is extremely well written. I stumbled upon very few (minor) formal 
or grammatical issues that the authors may want to take into account if they ever intend 
to publish a third edition. An additional comment: ‘America’/‘Americans’/‘American’ 
should read ‘North America’/‘North Americans’/‘North American’ (or ‘US-American’ 
or ‘Anglo-American’). This is not a mere issue of political correctness. Given Baert and 
Silva’s emphasis on the importance of intercultural understanding, I think Latin- 
American scholars are right to point out that we should avoid reproducing the self- 
referential and hegemonic language of Anglocentric social science. 
5.    See pp. 24,  28,  and 35–6. 
6.    See pp. 24,  28,  and 35–6. 
7.    See  pp. 196–7. 
8.    See  pp.  216–22  and  229. 
9.    See  p. 250. 
10. To be fair, most publishers expect their authors to adhere to a particular word limit 
policy, and this may be one of the main reasons why Baert and Silva pay marginal 
attention to the impact of classical sociology on contemporary social theory. 
 
  
11. On the limited scope of Baert and Silva’s analysis, see p. 286: ‘[. . .] the golden generation 
of twentieth-century European social theory. We are referring to a generation of 
intellectuals and academics, born between the world wars, that includes, for instance, 
Pierre Bourdieu, Niklas Luhmann, Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault and Anthony 
Giddens.’ Again, to be fair, the word limit policy imposed upon the two authors by the 
publishers may have been a noteworthy obstacle. 
12. In light of the above criticism, cynical commentators may suggest that a more 
appropriate title for this book would have been something along the lines of White, 
Western, Malestream Social Theory in the Twentieth Century and Beyond. It seems to me 
that this would be a somewhat unjustiﬁed criticism, because modern social theory is 
largely ‘white’, ‘Western’, and ‘malestream’. The more interesting question is to what 
extent twenty-ﬁrst century social theory will be able to break out of the ethnocentric and 
androcentric straitjacket of modern intellectual thought. 
13. The list reads as follows: Chapter 1: Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand de Saussure, Claude 
Lévi-Strauss,   Pierre  Bourdieu,   Luc  Boltanski.   Chapter  2:  Talcott   Parsons, Robert 
Merton, Niklas Luhmann, Jeﬀrey Alexander. Chapter 3: George Herbert Mead, Erving 
Goﬀman, Harold Garﬁnkel, Randall Collins, Russell Hardin. Chapter 4: Jon Elster, 
Martin Hollis, David M. Kreps, Gary S. Becker, Paul DiMaggio, Walter W. Powell. 
Chapter 5: Anthony Giddens, Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Michael Mann, Shmuel 
Noah Eisenstadt. Chapter 6: Michel Foucault. Chapter 7: Jürgen Habermas, Claus Oﬀe, 
Axel Honneth. Chapter 8: Manuel Castells, Ulrich Beck, Zygmunt Bauman, Saskia 
Sassen, Richard Sennett. 
14. Jeﬀrey Alexander, Gary S. Becker, Randall Collins, Paul DiMaggio, Harold Garﬁnkel, 
Erving Goﬀman, Russell Hardin, David M. Kreps, George Herbert Mead, Robert  
Merton, Talcott Parsons, Walter W. Powell, Richard Sennett, Theda Skocpol, Charles 
Tilly. 
15. Ulrich Beck, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Niklas Luhmann, Claus Oﬀe. 
16. Luc Boltanski, Pierre Bourdieu, Émile Durkheim, Michel Foucault, Claude Lévi-Strauss. 
17. Anthony Giddens, Martin Hollis, Michael Mann. 
18. Ferdinand  de Saussure. 
19. Manuel Castells. 
20. Shmuel  Noah Eisenstadt. 
21. Zygmunt Bauman. 
22. Saskia Sassen. 
23. Jon Elster. 
24. Jeﬀrey Alexander, Zygmunt Bauman, Gary S. Becker, Manuel Castells, Randall Collins, 
Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, Jon Elster, Harold Garﬁnkel, Anthony Giddens, Erving 
Goﬀman, Russell Hardin, Martin Hollis, David M. Kreps, Paul  DiMaggio,  Michael 
Mann, George Herbert Mead, Robert Merton, Talcott Parsons, Walter  W.  Powell,  
Saskia Sassen, Richard Sennett, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly. 
25. Luc Boltanski, Pierre Bourdieu, Émile Durkheim, Michel Foucault, Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
Ferdinand  de Saussure. 
26. Ulrich Beck, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Niklas Luhmann, Claus Oﬀe. 
27. In defense of the authors, one may legitimately argue that this task goes beyond the 
scope of this book and would, therefore, require embarking upon a diﬀerent kind of 
journey, primarily and explicitly aimed at breaking out of the various (above- 
mentioned) ‘-istic’ straitjackets. One may add a few more minor criticisms to the list,  
but, to my mind, they are less signiﬁcant. An additional point worth considering is the 
following issue: in various contexts, the authors make reference to ‘classical’ sociological 
variables such as ‘class’, ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘gender’. It would have been useful to 
consider sociological questions arising from ‘sexual orientation’, ‘age’, and ‘ability’, 
since they are immensely important in the daily reproduction and transformation of 
power relations. 
28. In all  fairness,  the  authors  do  examine  some  of  these  commonalities,  for  instance, 
in their pertinent, and elegantly written, comparison of Bauman  and  Beck  on  pp.  262–
3. 
29. To give only one example, when assessing Beck’s work on p. 261, Baert and Silva 
maintain that  ‘empirical research does not back this up’,  but they fail to provide us with 
 
  
any (substantive) counter-evidence in support of their claim. In a possible third edition of 
the volume, it would be useful if the authors could provide examples to substantiate 
assertions such as the following: (a) ‘It is a common mistake amongst social researchers 
to consider or debate methodological issues without specifying what they want to 
achieve’ (p. 297). Is this really a common mistake amongst social researchers? If so, Baert 
and Silva need to provide examples to demonstrate that this is actually the case. (b) ‘[. . .] 
the orthodox view that modernity and the Holocaust are antithetical’ (p. 303). I do not 
think that, amongst contemporary historians and social scientists, modernity and the 
Holocaust tend to be regarded as antithetical. On the contrary, most historians and 
historical sociologists who specialize in the analysis of the multiple factors that led to the 
rise of fascism in Germany are willing to accept (or indeed insist upon) the fact that the 
Holocaust was possible only within modern society, that is, within the parameters 
imposed by its instrumental forces, notably functionalist rationality, capitalism, and 
large-scale bureaucracies. 
30. See p. 248: ‘A Brave New World? The Empirical  Turn in Social Theory’. 
31. Moreover, if  the  authors,  in  their  discussion  of  Castells,  are  right  to  state  that 
‘[t]he ‘‘old’’ urban sociology was [. . .] narrowly empiricist and lacked a proper 
‘‘theoretical object’’’ (p. 249), then it may be more appropriate to associate 
Castells’s work with the ‘conceptual turn’, rather than with  the ‘empirical turn’,  in 
social theory. 
32. In addition, Baert and Silva are willing to concede that ‘[s]ometimes [. . .] developments in 
social theory are sparked by empirical research’ (p.  286). 
33. Furthermore, it should be  noted  that,  on  various  occasions,  the  authors  criticize 
some of the social theorists whose work they examine for failing to ‘ﬂesh out the    
causal mechanisms behind the plethora of phenomena’ (p. 253; in this case, they refer    
to the work of Manuel Castells). As  hermeneutics-inspired  pragmatists,  Baert  and  
Silva are, at the same time, deeply critical of clear-cut separations between scientiﬁc 
knowledge and common sense (see, for example, pp. 295–6).  Hence, it appears to  be 
the case that we are confronted with a contradiction, which lies at the heart of Baert   
and Silva’s analysis: on the one hand,  they  insist  upon  the  notion  that  one  of  the 
main tasks of critical social scientists is to shed light on hidden structural forces and 
underlying causal mechanisms that shape both the nature and the development of the 
social world; on the other hand,  they  are  distrustful  of  the  view that  social  science 
has an ‘uncovering mission’ and that social scientists should be inspired  by  what 
Ricœur famously called the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’.  We  cannot  have  it  both  
ways. 
34. See p. 296: ‘it assumes an opposition between theory and knowledge, on the one hand, 
and practice and action on the other’. 
35. An anecdotal remark: One thing I have noticed is that the vast majority of native 
Anglophone colleagues with whom I have had the pleasure to work over the years,      
and who embrace the discourse of multiculturalism, are monocultural and 
monolingual. With all  respect,  this  makes  me  question  their  ability  to  appreciate 
the full complexity involved in the construction of multicultural realities, particularly   
on the  personal level, that is, in terms of internally divided forms of selfhood. The    
idea of a multicultural, multiperspectival,  and  cosmopolitan  social  scientist  sounds 
nice in theory, but it seems ironic that numerous social researchers generate 
academic discourses of multiculturalism from the hegemonic perspective of 
Anglocentrism. Pragmatist and post-colonial discourses may permit us to  become 
aware, but not necessarily to break out, of the Eurocentric straitjacket of 
Anglophone  social science. 
36. In this respect, it is ironic that Baert and Silva criticize other social theorists (such as 
Beck, see especially p. 261) for underestimating the continuing importance of class and 
the numerous ways in which it converts ‘reﬂexivity’, ‘individualization’, and ‘dialogic 
existence’ (p. 261) into late-modern privileges of the middle and upper  classes  of 
society. One may wonder to what extent access to the empowering nature of the key 
ingredients of their own program – that is, conceptualization, critique, ediﬁcation, and 
imagination – also remains a privilege of the well-oﬀ and well-educated members of 
society. 
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